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INTRODUcTION
F or the past thirty years, Professor Sax has been promoting a view
of the law that would permit the government to force private land-
owners to maintain their property in an undeveloped state without
any compensation for the benefit of Nature.1 His goal has been "to
propel nature's economy onto the legal agenda"2 where the state may
"subordinate private [property] use to demands for the maintenance
of natural services, even where the private owner's property is left val-
ueless."'3 These theories of Professor Sax and other proponents of his
philosophy might best be viewed as the Romantic period of takings
scholarship because they are grounded in an idealized view of Nature
and divorced from science, history, and the roots and branches of the
common law of property.'
Romantics wrongly believe that Nature is in "delicate balance"'5
and, a fortiori, any human development is destructive of that equilib-
rium. Nature, of course, is neither in nor out of balance in any mean-
* The author is a partner at Perkins Coie in Seattle, Washington, and specializes
in natural resource and environmental law. He represents major timber and resource
companies on environmental matters, including the Endangered Species Act, habitat
conservation planning, wildlife law and policy, and property rights litigation. The
views expressed in this article are his own and not those of any of his clients.
1. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Joseph
L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Joseph
L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993) [hereinafter Property Rights].
2. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1444.
3. Id. at 1453.
4. Of course, Professor Sax does not stand starry-eyed alone. See also David B.
Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the
Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311
(1988); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine
to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVrL. L. 723 (1989); Christopher D. Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?- Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 450 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE LJ. 1315 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Chadwick D. Oliver, A Landscape Approach: Achieving and Main-
taining Biodiversity and Economic Productivity, 90 J. FORESTRY 20, 20 (Sept. 1992):
Historically, natural forest communities were thought to exist in a benign
steady state, sometimes associated with climax, old-growth, or ancient for-
ests. Disturbances were considered unnatural, and the steady-state forest
was assumed to be most conducive to stability and diversity. Thus, preserv-
ing all species meant maintaining the forest in a natural, old condition-with
human intervention especially avoided.
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ingful sense of the word. After all, one can only know what is in
balance by knowing what to weigh (and similarly, one knows the rate
of loss of "biodiversity" only by knowing the baseline of what is
present).
Rather, Nature is dynamic, exemplified by natural disturbances on a
small scale to catastrophic proportions, and is fully capable of accom-
modating human disturbance within the dynamic.6 There is no "natu-
ral state" in Nature; there is only change,7 and change has no way of
differentiating between human and natural disturbance.
The very calculated use of the term "Nature" by Professor Sax is
revealing because in fact there are few places left that are undisturbed
by humans. What Professor Sax really means by "natural" is land
stripped of economic development potential. Thus, this is the true
connection between nature and "economy."8
As Professor Sax sees it, there are two fundamentally different ways
to view land, which in turn lead to two different ways to view property
rights:
[L]and in the "transformative economy" and land in the "economy
of nature." The conventional perspective of private property, the
transformative economy, builds on the image of property as a dis-
crete entity that can be made one's own by working it and trans-
forming it into a human artifact. A piece of iron becomes an anvil,
a tree becomes lumber, and a forest becomes a farm. Traditional
property law treats undeveloped land as essentially inert. The land
is there, it may have things on or in it (e.g., timber or coal), but it is
in a passive state, waiting to be put to use. Insofar as land is "do-
ing" something-for example, harboring wild animals-property
law considers such functions expendable. Indeed, getting rid of the
natural, or at least domesticating it, was a primary task of the Euro-
pean settlers of North America.
An ecological view of property, the economy of nature, is funda-
mentally different. Land is not a passive entity waiting to be trans-
formed by its landowner. Nor is the world comprised of distinct
tracts of land, separate pieces independent of each other. Rather,
an ecological perspective views land as consisting of systems defined
by their function, not by man-made boundaries. Land is already at
work, performing important services in its unaltered state. For ex-
ample, forests regulate the global climate, marshes sustain marine
fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place. Transformation
6. Id at 21.
7. E.g., Robert T. Lackey, Ecosystem Management: Desperately Seeking a Para-
digm (1994) (unpublished paper on file with Robert T. Lackey, Deputy Director, EPA
Environmental Research Laboratory, Corvallis, Oregon) (discussing ecosystem man-
agement as a management approach to help solve complex ecological and social
problems).
8. As an economic model, Nature is a poor guide for a sustainable society.
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diminishes the functioning of this economy and, in fact, is at odds
with it.9
The implications are plain: "Viewing land through the lens of na-
ture's economy reduces the significance of property lines"'10 and, thus,
the significance of property rights. In the Economy of Nature, a land-
owner no longer has the exclusive use and possession of property.
Rather, the very nature of land ownership changes. Instead of prop-
erty being in the service of its owner, it has the following limitations
and characteristics:
" connections dominate and boundary lines are irrelevant;
* ecological services determine land units, not the ingenuity of
willing sellers or the entrepreneurial ambitions of willing
buyers;
" land is in the public's service; it is part of a community or com-
mons where single ownership of an ecological unit is rare;
" land use is governed by ecological needs rather than the needs
of the owner or the enterprise; land has a destiny, a role to
play, so use rights are determined by physical nature and no
use inconsistent with the physical features of the land is permis-
sible (i.e., recharge areas [known as wetlands or swamps] can-
not be filled and wildlife habitat [known as commercial forests]
cannot be destroyed);
" "landowners have a custodial, affirmative protective role for
ecological functions .... The line between public and private is
blurred where maintenance of ecological service is viewed as
an owner's responsibility.""
Thus, in the Economy of Nature, "the landowner's desire to do any-
thing at all creates a problem, because any development affects the
delicate ecosystem which the untouched land supports.... The notion
that land is solely the owner's property, to develop as the owner
pleases, is unacceptable." 2
Against this backdrop, it is easy to comprehend the Romantics' dis-
satisfaction with the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.13 In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court determined
that a South Carolina law that, without just compensation, prevented
petitioner David Lucas from building homes on his two beachfront
lots (as the State had previously permitted his neighbors to do on their
lots) was an unconstitutional taking, unless the State was abating a
9. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1442 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
10. Id at 1445.
11. Itd at 1445-46.
12. Id at 1445. Of course, Professor Sax overstates his premise to prove his point.
The law of nuisance certainly constrains the uses to which property may be put
whether the landowner is pleased with the restriction or not.
13. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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nuisance. 14 In the Economy of Nature, the Lucas decision is incorrect
and compensation is not required because the property performs an
"ecological service" with which the owner has no right to interfere. 15
Put in Romantic terms:
The majority's current zeal to repel the perceived environmental-
ist assault on private property rests on serious misperceptions re-
garding the nature of land. The Court does not appreciate the now-
settled ecological notion that land "is not merely soil; it is a fountain
of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals."
Land is not a discrete, severable resource that respects the sur-
veyor's binary-based boundaries. It is part of a complex, interde-
pendent ecological system.'
6
However, Romantics would extend these values beyond beach
dunes to all ecosystem functions so that, for example, forests become
habitats for birds and wildlife instead of discrete tracts of land con-
taining the commodity timber. 7 For Romantics, protecting each tree
is important because Romantics also view Nature as the sum of all its
parts and, due to the interconnection of all things, no part may be
lost-the cogs and wheels must be kept, as the euphemism goes.'
8
14. 1l at 2900.
15. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1439 ("Lucas addresses legislation imposed to
maintain ecological services performed by land in its natural state."). The Romantics'
use of the terms "ecological services" is unfortunate because it has been the tradition
of our representative democracy to pay for the services provided to the public. Eco-
logical services are no different in kind than the services performed by the armed
forces in defense of the nation or welfare services provided to the poor. The public as
a whole pays the cost.
16. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411, 1421 (1993) (footnote omitted). Lazarus also contends that "[land is now a
highly regulated commodity, and its ownership is no longer the touchstone of human
autonomy or the source of individual freedom." Id. By way of rejoinder, one need
only cite Walter Lippmann:
[Tihe only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal eco-
nomic security of private property.
There is no surer way to give men the courage to be free than to
insure them a competence upon which they can rely. Men cannot be made
free by laws unless they are in fact free because no man can buy and no man
can coerce them. That is why the Englishman's belief that his home is his
castle and that the king cannot enter it... [is] the very essence of the free
man's way of life.
WALTER LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101, 102 (1934).
17. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1445. Of course, ownership of "the commod-
ity timber" has, as much as a fee simple absolute, "a rich tradition of protection at
common law," Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7, called a profit a pendre. See, e.g., Sequim
Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 94 P. 922, 923 (Wash. 1908) ("[I]f the state has authority to
invest one with the private ownership... such investiture must carry with it the right
to exercise dominion and ownership over what is upon the land.. . ."); Layman v.
Ledgett, 577 P.2d 970 (Wash. 1978 (right to cut timber for 40 years is a property
right).
18. The quote, "[t]o keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent
tinkering," is from the famous conservationist Aldo Leopold in THE RouND RIVER,
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"Ecosystem management" is the current manifestation of Professor
Sax's "everything is connected" rule. While there is no generally ac-
cepted definition of the concept, it has become the hallmark of cur-
rent environmental thinking and governmental policy. As the
Congressional Research Service recently noted:
The intensity of the effort is also striking. All these agencies are
devoting significant resources, both staff and financial, to this effort
at a time of budget constraints and Federal downsizing. But the
benefits of this approach, as they are defining it, seem to outweigh
any costs, assuming successful implementation. Equally striking is
the faith that the many government employees.., appear to place
in an ecosystem approach as a more rational way of serving the pub-
lic good.' 9
This quote is revealing for several reasons. First, it shows that there
is no defined approach to ecosystem management; rather, it is being
defined, at significant cost, as the agencies muddle along. Even Pro-
fessor Sax sees the opportunity for governmental abuse to "become
more intense as traditional property distinctions fade" into ecosys-
tems, which is what ecosystem management accomplishes.2"
Second, the end of ecosystem management is the "public good," yet
the proponents do not include just compensation for private landown-
ers restricted in the use of their property as among the "any costs"
worth paying. Cost is no object in redefining land-use management
within an ecosystem, even when implementation is doubtful, because
the price is paid by individual landowners within the ecosystem, not
the agencies. This is not even an instance of the majority resorting to
rule to take private property for public use without compensation be-
cause the agencies are not answerable to the electorate.2'
Lastly, the concept is not sound science but based on the "beliefs"
of the bureaucrats. In truth, ecosystems and the Economy of Nature
quoted in William R. Irvin, The Endangered Species Act. Keeping Every Cog and
Wheel, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 36 (Summer 1993). The Romantics never explain
why intelligent tinkering to conserve Nature is any less anthropocentric than tinkering
with Nature to make it more productive for humankind. In other words, what hap-
pens when you find out that you do not need every cog and wheel, reaching the fun-
damental policy decision that an unadorned bicycle gets you there as well as a car
even though it has fewer cogs and two less wheels.
19. WAYNE A. MORRISSEY ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL
AGENCY ACTIVITIES 4 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. 94-
339 ENR, 1994) (emphasis added).
20. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1454.
21. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1387 (1993) ("[P]eople should never be
allowed to take by majority vote without compensation what they would have to pay
for if they acted cooperatively in their private capacities. To allow otherwise would
cause a mass migration from the market and to the political process.").
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are nothing more than "mental constructs" fashioned by the Roman-
tics to forward their agenda of redefining property rights.22
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), one of the agencies
charged with administering the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"),
states that "[a]n ecosystem approach to fish and wildlife conservation
means protecting or restoring the function, structure, and species com-
position of an ecosystem while providing for its sustainable socioeco-
nomic use."'2 3 The FWS, like Professor Sax, is prepared for the
challenge of the Economy of Nature, recognizing that "[a]dopting an
ecosystem approach to fish and wildlife as an underlying foundation
for [their] operational activities will mean significantly changing the
way [they] think, act, and solve problems."' The FWS warns that it
will apply the concept of managing and protecting ecosystems to carry
out all of its functions, which include: reviewing permits, managing
National Wildlife Refuges, stocking fish, and other activities.25 In
other words, the overarching goal of ecosystem management in the
Economy of Nature is ecosystem protection at any cost. This is a re-
markable assertion since ecosystem management is not authorized by
statute or any other law.26
Ecosystem management can be seen as the policy tool for tinkering
with property rights in the Economy of Nature. As one commentator
recently asserted:
[R]esource use must bow to the paramount needs of the ecosystem.
Because the assumption is that maintenance of the ecosystem is the
highest good, any use that would impact the ecosystem must be
measured against that standard and justified on those terms. The
22. See Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Federal Ecosystem Management: A "Train Wreck"
in the Making, Policy Analysis No. 217, at 9-10 (Cato Institute Oct. 26, 1994) ("[T]he
ecosystem concept is geographically amorphous-a useful attribute in the realm of
research but a fatal flaw in the world of people, property, policy, and regulation. Eco-
systems in reality are mental constructs fashioned by researchers to forward some
particular analysis. A pond can be an ecosystem; so can the territory shared by two
species of trees or the space that forms the habitat of an insect or an eagle. Rather
than discrete entities, ecosystems are devices of analytic convenience and reflect all
the vagaries of research (e.g., project purpose, budget, data availability and quality,
and time constraints).").
23. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILD-
LIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE EFFECTIVELY CONSERVE THE NA-
TION'S BIODIVERSITY 1 (Mar. 1994).
24. Il at 5.
25. Id
26. Even though the ESA has as one of its principal purposes "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species de-
pend may be conserved," 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988), the ESA provides precious little
statutory basis for doing so, other than land acquisition by the government under § 5
of the Act. See infra notes 36 to 42 and accompanying text. But protecting ecosys-
tems is reminiscent of the pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill about the ESA-that Congress intended species to be protected at
"whatever the cost." 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). But at whatever cost to whom? Pri-
vate landowners or government institutions?
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burden of proof in an ecosystem management regime is therefore
on those who would use the resources within the ecosystem.27
Additionally, under an ecosystem management regime in the Econ-
omy of Nature, anyone in the ecosystem should have standing to chal-
lenge a particular land use activity as harmful-a form of "ecosystem
standing." The concept is that "any person who uses any part of a
'contiguous ecosystem' adversely affected.., has standing even if the
activity is located a great distance away."'28
The consequences to property rights are clear. Ecosystems, how-
ever [ill-]defined, transfer the private use of property into a partial
common pool in the Economy of Nature. To slightly paraphrase Rich-
ard Epstein, ecosystem management schemes like:
Land use regulation place[ ] the land back into a modified common
pool, where many persons can limit the future use of the land, even
though only one person, the owner, can actually use it. Ill-defined
rights replace well-defined ones, and transaction cost barriers are
likely to exceed the gains that otherwise are obtainable from any
shift in land use or ownership. Another negative-sum game.29
In terms of traditional property law, in the Economy of Nature the
landowner's fee simple absolute is converted into a mere usufruct with
executory30 and contingent remainders in some unknown class of non-
human heirs in perpetuity. The Rule against Perpetuities 31 becomes a
Rule for Perpetuities 32 -or, stated in modern jargon, a Rule of Sus-
tainabilities. Of course, this is contrary to the history of the common
law of property,3 3 which is based upon bringing certainty to real prop-
erty transactions and eliminating uncertain and unpredictable results
when the fee simple is not absolute. In the Economy of Nature, no
27. Thomas C. Jackson & Joshua S. Wyner, The New Hot Doctrine: Ecosystem
Management, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at C6, C7.
28. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1992) (rejecting ecosys-
tem standing). In addition to rejecting the "inelegantly styled 'ecosystem nexus' "for
standing, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, also rejected the "'animal nexus' ap-
proach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered
animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the 'vocational nexus' approach,
under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue." Id
29. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM-
iNENT DOMAIN 265 (1985).
30. An executory remainder is a contingent remainder "where the estate is limited
to take effect either to a dubious and uncertain person or upon a dubious and uncer-
tain event." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990).
31. The Rule against Perpetuities prohibits granting an estate that will not vest in
some person within a time limited by a life in being and 21 years thereafter. Id. at
1331.
32. "A perpetuity is a limitation which takes the subject-matter of the perpetuity
out of commerce for a period greater than a life or lives in being and 21 years thereaf-
ter, plus ordinary period of gestation." Id. at 1141.
33. The common law tradition of Livery of Seisen would likely be a criminal act,
or at least one requiring a dredge and fill permit, in the Economy of Nature.
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amount of due diligence could protect the purchaser unless all habitat
has first been removed-hardly a desirable outcome for wildlife.
Thus, one sees that in the Romantics' world, the Economy of Na-
ture is not a place for the fainthearted. The high roller may risk every-
thing for resources today, only to see the dividend sequestered for
some future generation neither related by blood nor through risk of
investment in the land. Indeed, Nature's economy is an endless series
of forced exchanges between always-unwilling sellers and never-un-
witting buyers. These exchanges occur randomly with no predictabil-
ity, leaving the property subject to contingent, executory interests in
others or things.
While pluralism demands a place for the views of such Romantics in
the marketplace of ideas, the implications of their ideas are antitheti-
cal to the foundations of our society and its constitutional underpin-
nings. While property had been viewed historically as the bulwark of
representative democracy and the springboard to freedom, the Ro-
mantics view it as principally in the service of society. Ownership is
transformed into mere use contingent upon its consistency with the
greater needs of society. Society takes the rent from the ecological
services provided by the property, while the owner gets the remain-
der, which, in many cases, is precious little due to the transaction
costs.
I. THE ROLE OF THE ESA IN THE ECONOMY OF NATURE AND
THE IMPACT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
Professor Sax has argued that "[t]he target of Lucas is broader than
its immediate concern of coastal dune maintenance; the opinion...
anticipates cases that will be brought under section nine of the Endan-
gered Species Act, under which private landowners may be required
to leave their land undisturbed as habitat."'  His prediction will be
tested this Court Term because the regulation that defines an unlawful
"take" of a threatened or endangered species as including "significant
habitat modification" is presently before the Court.35 Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon is an important
case because it will determine whether the ESA has a role in the
Economy of Nature and, potentially, whether government can require
landowners to keep their land in its natural state as wildlife habitat.
34. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1439.
35. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F.
Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995) (No. 94-859).
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A. The ESA in the Economy of Naiure
The importance of preserving the habitat of threatened or endan-
gered species is recognized throughout the ESA. A species may be
listed as endangered on the basis of "the present or threatened de-
struction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat. '3 6 Concurrent
with listing, to the maximum extent prudent and determinable, the
Secretary is to "designate any habitat of such species which is then
considered to be critical habitat."'37 Once a species is listed, all federal
departments and agencies are required to ensure that no actions are
authorized, funded, or carried out that are likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the species in the wild or result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of designated critical habitat.38 In addi-
tion, in developing recovery plans for the conservation and survival of
listed species, the government must include "site-specific management
actions as may be necessary to achieve the plan's goal for the conser-
vation and survival of the species." 39
Indeed, one of the principal purposes of the ESA when it was en-
acted in 1973 was "to provide a. means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be con-
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A) (1988).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (1988). Critical habitat was not defined in the 1973
ESA, but a joint interagency regulation promulgated a definition in 1978:
"Critical habitat" means any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those
existing man-made structures or settlements which are not necessary to the
survival and recovery of a listed species) and constituent elements thereof,
the loss of which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival
and recovery of a listed species or a distinct segment of its population. The
constituent elements of critical habitat include, but are not limited to: physi-
cal structures and topography, biota, climate, human activity, and the quality
and chemical content of land, water, and air. Critical habitat may represent
any portion of the present habitat of a listed species and may include addi-
tional areas for reasonable population expansion.
Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 870, 874-75
(1978).
The definition of critical habitat was redefined and incorporated into the statute in
the 1978 Amendments as follows:
The term "critical habitat" for a threatened or endangered species
means-
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed.., on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(II) which may require special management considerations or protec-
tion; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the spe-
cies at the time it is listed.., upon a determination by the Secretary that
such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, sec. 2, § 3(5)(A), 92 Stat. 3751, 3751
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (1988)).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
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served."4 However, to the extent this hortatory comment has been
viewed as a herald of the role of the ESA in the Economy of Nature,
it is a herald doomed to disappoint because Congress provided pre-
cious little statutory authority to achieve the objective. The only ex-
press prohibition against destruction of habitat applied exclusively to
the government under section 7 but only as to designated "critical
habitat."41 As to protection of this and other habitat, section 5 of the
ESA provided the only other mechanism-federal land acquisition.42
Once acquired, the critical habitat protections of section 7 would then
apply.
Thus, where, does the claim that the ESA restricts the use of private
property originate? The answer can be found in agency application of
section 7's consultation requirement and section 9's prohibition on
"take" to private landowners.
1. Section 7 Impacts on Private Lands
Section 7(a)(2) prohibits the government from authorizing, funding,
or carrying out any action likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of a threatened or endangered species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of the critical habitat of such species. 3 Under
section 7, private landowners can be affected by the ESA if they re-
quire some form of federal approval for their activities, such as a per-
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988). It is interesting to note that nowhere else in the
ESA is the term "ecosystems" even mentioned or defined.
41. The original ESA bill referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, S.
1983, defined prohibited take to include "the destruction,'modification, or curtailment
of its habitat or range." S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(6) (1973), reprinted in STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & Pun. WORKS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGIsLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977,
1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 228 (Comm. Print 1982). The Senate ultimately rejected the
habitat destruction language in favor of the current definition but without comment in
the legislative history.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1988). In passing the ESA, Congress noted:
Often, protection of habitat is the only means of protecting endangered ani-
mals which occur on non-public lands. With programs for protection under-
way, and worthy of continuation into the foreseeable future, an accelerated
land acquisition program is essential.
S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989,
2992. See also Remarks of Senator Tunney (D-Cal.), 119 CONG. REC. 25,668, 25,669.
(1973):
Many species have been inadvertently exterminated by a negligent de-
struction of their habitat. Their habitats have been cut in size, polluted, or
otherwise altered so that they are unsuitable environments for natural popu-
lations of fish and wildlife. Under this bill, we can take steps to make
amends for our negligent encroachment. The Secretary would be empow-
ered to use the land acquisition authority granted to him in certain existing
legislation to acquire land for the use of the endangered species pro-
grams.... Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to
conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further
destruction.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
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mit or license, or if their project involves federal funding. If any of
these federal activities are likely to affect listed species or their critical
habitat adversely," the permitting or funding agency and private ap-
plicant must "consult" with the FWS to determine: (1) whether the
project is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species or
result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat, and (2)
what measures will be required to minimize the impacts of the
project.45
If the result of the consultation is a finding by the FWS that the
proposed action-i.e., issuance of a permit to dredge and fill a wet-
land under section 404 of the Clean Water Act46 -is likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the species or result in the destruction
of designated critical habitat, the FWS must propose reasonable and
prudent alternatives that will avoid the jeopardy or critical habitat de-
struction. 7 According to the FWS, jeopardy may be the result of the
cumulative effects of multiple unrelated projects, even though the im-
pacts from the project standing alone would not lead to such a result.48
In the end, the action cannot be authorized if the result is jeopardy
or destruction of habitat.49 To proceed, the applicant or federal
agency project proponent would have to seek an exemption from the
Endangered Species Committee, a rare and seldom used procedure.5 0
If the project is not likely to result in jeopardy or destruction of
critical habitat, but may "incidentally take" a listed species, it may
proceed with an exemption from the prohibition against "take" in
ESA's section 9, provided the take is incidental to the purpose of the
otherwise lawful activity.5' The FWS will issue an incidental take
statement imposing such "reasonable and prudent measures that the
Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such
impact." 52
It is in the incidental take statement that the government extracts
concessions from landowners who are at a distinct disadvantage in the
bargaining process because of the need for a permit to commence or
continue the project. The Government Accounting Office ("GAO")
44. The FWS's position is that formal consultation is required when there is dis-
cretionary federal involvement in or control over the project, whether obvious (as in
issuance of a permit) or less direct (such as State administration of a program that
retains federal oversight like the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Program under the Clean Water Act). See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING SEC-
TION 7 CONSULTATIONS AND CONFERENCES 2-7 (Nov. 1994 Draft).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a), (b) (1988).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988).
48. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 44, at 4-34 to 4-35.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1988).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (1988).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii) (1988).
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recently acknowledged that routinely "nonfederal landowners have
been required to modify their planned or ongoing activities to mini-
mize and/or mitigate the impacts of their activities on protected
species."53
The examples provided by the GAO in its Report illustrate that the
focus of mitigation measures imposed under section 7 has been to pro-
tect habitat, rather than to minimize the taking of listed species. The
GAO cited the example of a California developer that proposed
building a retail outlet mall on land containing wetland habitat for the
Sebastopol meadowfoam, a protected plant:54
Because the developer needed authorization from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) to fill wetland areas, the Corps con-
sulted with the Service on measures the developer needed to take to
mitigate the project's impact on the plant. The consultation, which
proceeded to the formal stage, resulted in the developer's agreeing
to (1) establish a new Sebastopol meadowfoam colony in an off-site
area and (2) acquire and protect additional habitat containing an
existing natural population of the species.55
This example is remarkable for several reasons. First, listed plants
under the ESA are protected only on federal lands or to the extent
protected by state law.56 Nothing but good conscience would have
prevented the developer from picking all of the plants in the wetland
before applying for the fill permit. Yet, through the fill permit, the
prohibitions on destruction of the plant are applied to the private
landowner.
Second, critical habitat had not been designated for the species for
fear of vandalism,57 but this occurrence on the developer's land clearly
was not the only known population. The fact that the project was al-
lowed to proceed demonstrated the FWS's opinion that neither the
critical habitat of the plant nor its likelihood of survival in the wild
was threatened by the development, otherwise section 7 would have
mandated disapproval of the fill permit.
Third, to use the developer's own land, the developer had to ac-
quire new land off-site. This amount of the exaction was not stated by
the GAO, but numerous examples of such "mitigation ratios" exist in
reported cases. For instance, in Morrill v. Lujan,58 a developer owned
eight acres of beach frontage upon which he sought to build a hotel
53. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUES-
TERS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT- INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON
NONFEDERAL LANDS 7 (GAO/RCED-95-16, Dec. 1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
54. See Determination of Endangered Status for Three Plants . . .Limnanthes
Vinculans (Sebastopol meadowfoam), 56 Fed. Reg. 61,173 (1991) (codified at 60
C.F.R. § 17) [hereinafter Three Plants Determination].
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 7 (footnote omitted).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988).
57. See Three Plants Determination, supra note 54, at 61,177-78, 61,180-81.
58. 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
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and dock. To do so, he needed a federal permit from the Army Corps
of Engineers ("Corps"), and, because the proposed dock was "in the
vicinity" of habitat occupied by the endangered Perdido Key Beach
mouse, consultation under section 7 with the FWS was required.
59
The FWS determined that development of the property would jeop-
ardize the continued existence of the mouse and offered as a "reason-
able and prudent alternative" to a denial of the Corps permit that the
developer "purchase the remaining 21.5 acres of privately-owned
property and deed it to the State 'for preservation and management as
habitat for the Perdido Key Beach mouse.' "60 As a consequence, the
developer dropped the plan to build a dock and simply proceeded
with the hotel, which did not require a federal permit.61
As the foregoing illustrates, section 7 of the ESA relies on a habitat
modification rule as a prohibited take to impose "reasonable and pru-
dent measures" forcing landowners to leave some or all of their land
in a natural state for the benefit of wildlife.62 The genesis of that
habitat rule, however, really is in section 9 of the ESA.
2. Section 9 of the ESA
Section 9 of the ESA, which makes it unlawful for any person to
"take" any listed species of fish or wildlife,63 has been the true catalyst
for habitat protection. The ESA defines "take" to mean "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct."'
59. Id. at 428.
60. 1d
61. Id. The developer was sued anyway by a private citizen who contended that
the development would result in a prohibited "take" of the beach mouse by habitat
modification. Id. at 426. The complaint argued that a take might occur (1) because
construction could kill or injure any mice on the property, (2) habitat would be de-
graded, and (3) the completed project would lead to an influx of house mice, feral
cats, and human foot traffic on designated critical habitat to the south of the devel-
oper's property. Id. at 430. The court rejected these claims because no mice had ever
been seen on the property, habitat modification alone was insufficient to prove a take,
and there was insufficient cause and effect to find a take. The court unmasked the
plaintiff's central purpose: "The plaintiff... would like to preserve every square inch
and grain of sand of the potential beach mouse habitat, and stop any possibility of
outside human or predator intrusion with the truly laudable goal of affording a tiny
creature every conceivable possibility of survival. But to paraphrase Stuart Little,
their wishes and the law are not the same . . . ." Id. at 433-34. Stuart Little is a
literary reference to a story of the same name by E.B. White about a mouse born to
human parents and its travails.
62. The GAO Report concluded that "80 of the 105 species for which critical
habitat has been designated have a portion of that critical habitat on nonfederal lands.
More than half of these ... species ... have over 80 percent of their critical habitat on
nonfederal lands." GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 6. Over 90% (712 of 781) of the
listed species have some or all of their habitat, whether designated critical or not, on
nonfederal lands. Id. at 4.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
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Through regulation, the FWS has defined the term "harm," as it
appears in the definition of "take," to prohibit significant habitat mod-
ification that kills or injures wildlife: "Harm in the definition of 'take'
in the [ESA] means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.
Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing es-
sential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering."65
The breadth of this definition is astounding. The FWS has provided
some example of how the definition is to be applied:
Identifying habitat modifications that harm individuals of a spe-
cies involves understanding the species' life history. For example,
the Florida scrub jay is highly territorial and relies for its existence
on food cached within its territory. A project that destroys occu-
pied habitat and thus the food supply for that family group is likely
to result in their starvation. Similarly, a number of birds are highly
site-tenacious, returning year after year to the same nesting site.
Removal of nesting habitat on that site is likely to result in loss of
the pair's reproductive capability, and may result in loss of the pair
for lack of available feeding or nesting habitat. Opening up or frag-
menting the habitat may similarly affect the species by introducing
increased predation or parasitism. 66
The FWS has employed the broad harm definition, both under sec-
tion 7 and section 9, to stymie a variety of otherwise lawful land uses,
such as the harvesting of timber over vast areas of land.67 Perhaps the
most illustrative example of the FWS's application of the "harm" defi-
nition is the so-called northern spotted owl guidelines.
65. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
66. U.S. Fisii & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 44, at 4-43.
67. The evolution of this definition and its application are beyond the scope of this
article. For a complete discussion, see Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act:
Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419 (1994).
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a. Spotted Owl Guidelines"
The northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) was listed as a
threatened species on June 26, 1990.69 In July 1990, FWS Region 1
promulgated "informal" guidelines to determine when a prohibited
take would occur from timber harvesting and related activities in and
around known spotted owl sites.7°
The Guidelines established "owl circles" of various sizes centered
around a nest site or center of activity. Timber harvest and other for-
est management activities were prohibited if such actions left (1) "less
than 70 acres of the best available suitable owl habitat" around the
nest site, (2) "less than 500 acres of suitable habitat within a 0.7-mile
radius (1000 acres) of a nest site," or (3) less than a 40% suitable owl
coverage within a circle with a radius of 1.2 to 2.2 miles, depending on
68. It is not just the case of the owl of course that has lead to landowners being
forced to keep their property in its natural state for the benefit of wildlife. The
testimony of one private citizen in the recent reauthorization hearings sums up the
dilemma nicely:
I am here to speak for those millions of Americans who would like to 'see
a fair and balanced ESA.... In 1984 my husband and I purchased 1.45 acres
to build our homestead. We worked hard for the next nine years to make
enough money so that we could build our home. By the summer of 1993 we
had managed to save enough to finally begin the process of planning and
construction.
As some of you may know, the area around Austin, Texas is home to a
number of species listed under the ESA. One of those species is the golden-
cheeked warbler. On the advice of our architect, we sought from the FWS a
document, known as a "bird letter," without which we could not likely
obtain a loan. Essentially, the bird letter acknowledges that a property
owner's land has been unoccupied (by warblers) for at least three years, or
that there is no suitable habitat on the land....
FWS told us that.., our property was in a suitable habitat area, thus, the
FWS said, we would need a section 10(a) permit before we could build our
home.
We asked what a 10(a) permit was, and what it would require us to do.
The FWS told us that we would need to "mitigate" by setting aside land for
habitat. I told them that we only had 1.45 acres, and that we didn't have any
land to set aside. Their response was that we could purchase other land
elsewhere that was good mitigation habitat. We were astonished-this felt
like extortion-buying land for the government in exchange for the right to
use our own land.
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Clean Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1994) (statement of Mary A. Davidson).
69. Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed.
Reg. 26,114 (1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11) (the effective date of the rule was
July 23, 1990).
70. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REGION 1, PROCEDURES LEADING TO ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACT COMPLIANCE FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (July 1990)
[hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines were promulgated without the benefit of
public notice, comment, or other rule-making procedures required under the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy State-
ments, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to
Bind the Public?, 41 DutE L.J. 1311, 1365-71 (1992).
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location.7 In other words, the FWS set aside 3960 acres of timber
(40% of a 2.2 mile circle) per nest site under the guise of preventing a
prohibited take under section 9 of the ESA.
The substantive and procedural validity of the Guidelines were
challenged by a grassroots timber industry group in Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Turner.7" In light of
this challenge, FWS withdrew the Guidelines and moved to dismiss
the suit as moot.73 Based on the unequivocal revocation of the Guide-
lines, the court dismissed the suit, declaring that "plaintiffs are seeking
to prevent enforcement of the Guidelines. That is precisely what the
FWS has now done: FWS declared that the Guidelines were re-
scinded, thereby clearly indicating its intention no longer to apply or
enforce them."74
Notwithstanding the express representations to the court, and the
court's reliance on those representations in dismissing the suit, the
FWS continued to apply the 70-500-40 Rule as a bright-line test to
determine whether a prohibited take might occur and whether such
action should be enjoined or prosecuted .7  Landowners in Washing-
ton State who, under state law, could lawfully harvest all but 500 acres
of suitable habitat around known owl sites,76 received letters from an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Western District of Washing-
ton threatening prosecution for illegal takes under federal law if such
operations commenced.77
71. GUIDELINES, supra note 70, at 10. This is the so-called 70-500-40 Rule.
72. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 91-2218 (D.D.C. filed
Aug. 30, 1991).
73. See Letter from H. Dale Hall, Assistant Regional Director, FWS, to Wayne S.
White et al., Field Supervisors, FWS Field Offices (Oct. 2, 1991) (on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
74. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Turner, No. 91-
2218, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1992).
75. See, e.g., Letter from Russell D. Peterson, Field Supervisor, FWS, to Aaron
Jones, Seneca Sawmill Corp. (Mar, 30, 1992) (advising that a planned harvest and
road construction within the median home range of a known spotted owl pair would
result in a prohibited take by. "reducing the amount of suitable habitat to below levels
that would maintain the reproductive success of this pair") (on file with the Fordham
Environmental Law Journal); see also Letter from Curt Smitch, Director, Washington
Department of Wildlife and David Frederick, Field Supervisor, FWS, to Washington
Forest Practices Board Members 2 (June 25, 1992) (urging the Board to "reconsider"
a proposed state rule for the owl that would provide less protection than the 70-500-
40 Rule because it "could lead to actions that may be in conflict with provisions of the
[ESA].") (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
76. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-080(1)(h) (1993).
77. See, e.g., Letter from Mike McKay, United States Attorney and Brian C.
Kipnis, Assistant United States Attorney, to Peter R. Waldrip, Rayonier Tmberlands
Operating Co. (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
b. United States v. Anderson & Middleton Logging Co. 78
Anderson & Middleton Logging Co. ("A&M") received one of the
prosecutor's threatening letters. A&M owned seventy-two acres of
old growth timber on the Olympic Peninsula in Washington. Under
Washington State's 500-acre rule, A&M had a valid state permit to
harvest the timber and notified the government of its intent to pro-
ceed before commencing harvesting.
On December 9, 1993, the United States Department of Interior
sought to enjoin A&M from harvesting the timber, claiming that such
harvesting would violate section 9 of the ESA by "harming" or
"harassing" a pair of spotted owls sited on federal lands almost two
miles away.79 The Complaint alleged that unlawful harm would occur
from harvest by the possible "impairment of reproductivity" or possi-
ble "death by starvation or exposure to predators" at some future
time.80 In the Declaration accompanying the Complaint, the govern-
ment's expert admitted that there was no proof that any spotted owl
had ever flown through, let alone nested, roosted, or foraged on the
property.81 Notwithstanding, the biologist declared under oath that
the harvest had to be enjoined to prevent a take that would diminish
the owl circle to below 40% cover.82
Remarkably, only three months earlier, the government had ap-
proved the incidental take of the same owl pair through a section 7
consultation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). BIA re-
quested formal consultation on a Quinault Indian Nation timber sale
of seventy-five acres of old growth adjacent to the A&M property.83
FWS provided the Quinault Tribe with an incidental take statement
permitting harvest of this timber within the same owl circle as the
A&M property while A&M and other landowners in Washington
were being threatened with prosecution if they cut their timber. As
the Biological Opinion for the Quinault indicated,84 no part of the owl
circle at issue is within designated critical habitat for the spotted owl.8 5
78. Complaint, United States v. Anderson & Middleton Logging Co., No. C93-
5697 (W.D. Wash. filed Dec. 9, 1993).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Declaration of E. Charles Meslow for the United States at 7, 12-13, United
States v. Anderson & Middleton Logging Co., No. C93-5697 (W.D. Wash. fied Dec.
9, 1993).
82. Id. at 12 ("The further the amount of suitable habitat falls below 40%, the
more precious each remaining patch of suitable habitat becomes.").
83. See U.S. FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON FORMAL
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION ON THE NORTH FIVE TIMBER SALE, QUINAULT INDIAN
NATION 1-2 (FWS Ref. 1-3-93-F-515, Aug. 30, 1993).
84. Id at 3.
85. The FWS previously determined that the 6.9 million acres of designated criti-
cal habitat on federal lands for the owl were sufficient to ensure the conservation and
recovery of the owl. Thus, the FWS decided to exclude non-federal lands from con-
sideration as designated critical habitat. Determination of Critical Habitat for the
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More recently, the FWS released for public comment a draft rule
for conservation of the spotted owl on non-federal lands under section
4(d) of the ESA. 86 If this rule is adopted, A&M would have no obli-
gation to preserve any habitat. Under the proposed rule, larger owl
circles would be maintained within proposed special emphasis areas
("SEAs"). The property on the Olympic Peninsula where the owl pair
was spotted is not a SEA. Since the particular owl pair is located
outside of a designated SEA, it would receive only seventy acres of
protection around its nest site.87
c. Sweet Home Challenge to the FWS's Harm Regulation'
The same parties that challenged the owl Guidelines in Sweet Home
also challenged the FWS's harm regulation. In essence, the plaintiffs
averred that they were private landowners forced to maintain some or
all of their private property in its natural state for the benefit of a
threatened or endangered species to avoid prosecution under the
ESA.89 Typical of the plaintiffs is Ernmy G. Birkenfeld, the trustee of
the William F. Birkenfeld Trust, the corpus of which includes 5600
acres of land eligible for timber harvest near Carson, Washington. As
averred in the Sweet Home Complaint:
The income derived from harvesting timber from these lands sup-
ports Mrs. Birkenfeld, her two sons, and her sons' families. Mrs.
Birkenfeld had been able to harvest timber from the 5600 acres un-
til recently when spotted owls were discovered nearby, and under
the regulations challenged in this lawsuit Mrs. Birkenfeld risks pros-
ecution for an ESA "taking" if she harvests her land. Every appli-
cation for approval to harvest timber submitted by Mrs. Birkenfeld
has been substantially denied.
Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1811 (1992). The designation of critical
habitat was challenged successfully in Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D.
Or. 1992), for failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). However, the Ninth Circuit, stating that NEPA does not apply to the
Secretary of the Interior's decision to designate a critical habitat for an endangered
species under the ESA, reversed in part Douglas County. Douglas County v. Babbitt,
Nos. 93-36013, 93-36016, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3532 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995).
86. See Proposed Special Rule for the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl
on Non-Federal Lands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9500 (1995). Section 4(d) of the ESA
grants the Secretary the authority to apply any or all of the prohibitions in § 9 for
endangered species to threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988).
87. See Figures 4 and 5, Proposed Special Rule for the Conservation of the North-
ern Spotted Owl on Non-Federal Lands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9520-21.
88. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F.
Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995) (No. 94-859).
89. Complaint at 2-3, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 91-1468), aff'd sub nom. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995) (No.
94-859).
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Moreover, Mrs. Birkenfeld has been denied the right to harvest
three parcels, each approximately 200 acres in size, for which ap-
provalihad previously been given. After harvesting had begun pur-
suant to those approvals, the Washington State Department of
Natural Resources issued stop orders to the trust, in reliance on the
challenged regulations, claiming that its operations might harm or
harass a spotted owl through habitat modification and therefore re-
sult in a take. Since the operations were allegedly within 1.8 miles
of a known spotted owl nest or breeding pair and would reduce
available suitable habitat for the owl, the state ordered all timber
falling on these parcels stopped indefinitely.
Because of the foregoing restrictions which have been placed on
Mrs. Birkenfeld's use of the trust property, in reliance on the chal-
lenged regulations, Mrs. Birkenfeld is currently unable to cut timber
from any of the 5600 acres that would otherwise be available for
harvesting. The Birkenfelds have accordingly been deprived of the
needed income from the trust and, as a result, have lost the financial
support that the trust was designed to provide.
90
The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the FWS's regulatory definition
of harm on several theories, including void for vagueness, but the Dis-
trict Court rejected all challenges.9' The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the district court decision but split on
the issue of the scope of the "taking" prohibition and whether it en-
compassed habitat modification.92 In upholding the FWS's definition,
Judge Mikva wrote:
[T]here are obviously types of activity, including habitat modifica-
tion, that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 clearly prohibits without a hint of vague-
ness. For example, it obviously forbids the very sort of conduct that
appellants argue it should be limited to-' habitat modification that
causes ascertainable physical injury or death to an individual mem-
ber of a listed species. Furthermore, § 17.3 unquestionably prohib-
its major acts of habitat degradation that destroy a species' ability to
breed, feed, or shelter. For instance, a person aware of the regula-
tion would undoubtedly be held accountable for clear-cutting an en-
tire forested area known to be populated by spotted owls."
However, after a petition for rehearing, the court reversed on the
habitat modification rule, relying on the principle of noscitur a
sociis-that a word is known by the company it keeps-to find that
the FWS's definition of harm far exceeded Congressional intent in in-
cluding the term harm in the definition of take in the statute.94 The
court applied this principle because of "the gulf between the [FWS's]
habitat modification concept of 'harm' and the other words of the stat-
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. 806 F. Supp. 279 .(D.D.C. 1992).
92. 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
93. Id at 4-5.
94. 17 F.3d 1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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utory definition, and the implications in terms of the resulting extinc-
tion of private rights." 95 Drawing support from Lucas, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
As a matter of pure linguistic possibility one can easily recast any
withholding of a benefit as an infliction of harm .... [I]t is linguisti-
cally possible to read "harm" as referring to a landowner's with-
holding of the benefits of a habitat that is beneficial to a species. A
farmer who harvests crops or trees on which a species may depend
harms it in the sense of withdrawing a benefit; if the benefit with-
drawn be important, then the [FWS's] regulation sweeps up the
farmer's decision.96
The decision goes to the heart of private landowner concerns about
FWS's application of the habitat modification rule:
The implications of the [FWS's] definition suggest its improbable
relation to congressional intent. Species dependency may be very
broad. One adherent of aggressive protection, for instance, notes
that "[s]ome scientists believe as many as 35 million to 42 million
acres of land are necessary to the survival of grizzlies", about as
much land in the northern Rockies of the United States and Canada
as is still usable grizzly habitat. 97
The decision also goes to the heart of the Economy of Nature. As
the government stated in its petition for certiorari, "[t]he issue in this
case is one of exceptional importance."98 The government is correct.
Underscoring the application of harm in the Economy of Nature, the
government asserted in the petition that "the cutting of a nest tree in
which an endangered species dwells and breeds can effectively kill the
bird, regardless of whether the bird is at home when the tree falls."'
The government's petition was an echo of the Romantics who have
long urged that section 9's reach includes habitat modification:
[I]f an activity results in the destruction of an area essential for nest-
ing by an endangered migratory bird, that activity will be considered
to "harm" the species by preventing it from nesting and reproducing
even though the activity may have occurred while the birds were on
their wintering grounds and thus may not have caused any immedi-
ate physical injury to any individual bird.1°°
95. Id.
96. Id at 1464-65.
97. Id. at 1465 (citing ROCKY BARKER, SAVING ALL THE PARTS 34 (1993)).
98. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1993), rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995)
(No. 94-859).
99. Id. at 25-26.
100. MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 344 (1983).
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The Supreme Court granted review of Sweet Home on January 6,
1995 and heard oral arguments April 17, 1995.101 In the end, we will
know whether the ESA prohibits some or all habitat modifications. If
it does prohibit habitat modification, the question becomes whether
such a result "takes" private property for public use and requires pay-
ment of just compensation to the aggrieved landowner. If it does not,
the takings question is moot.
II. DOES THE ESA "TAKE" PRIVATE PROPERTY?
Some argue that the ESA does not have the capacity to "take" pri-
vate property. 10 2 For example, during reauthorization hearings in
1994, Michael J. Bean of the Environmental Defense Fund testified
before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works that
"no claim has yet been filed in the U.S. Court of Claims, the federal
court empowered to hear takings claims, that any landowner any-
where has suffered a taking of his land as a result of any requirement
of the Endangered Species Act."103
The analysis should start with the admonition of Justice Scalia in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: °
[A]ffirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact
that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by
requiring land to be left in its natural state-carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm ....
101. 63 U.S.L.W. 3814 (May 16, 1995).
102. For an excellent summary of Fifth Amendment takings and wildlife law, see
Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369 (1994), although the author concludes incorrectly, in my
view, that the ESA does not work an unconstitutional taking.
103. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Clean Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Pub-
lic Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1994) (statement of Michael J. Bean, Environmen-
tal Defense Fund); see also id. at 4 (statement of Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont)) ("It
is important to note that there has never been a case under the Act in which a court
has found that the Act has resulted in unconstitutional taking of private property.").
But this facile argument proves too much and is too clever by half. Simply because
no one has been charged with theft, tried for the crime, or been convicted of stealing
does not mean that the property still is not missing. If every victim of a crime of theft
had to pay for the prosecution of the thief, prove that all of the property and not just
some part of it had been taken, and exhaust all other possible administrative reme-
dies, such as development of a repayment plan with the thief, before going to court to
obtain the return of their property, one might well come to imagine that we live in a
crime-free society. Of course, the government is no common thief when it comes to
taking private property, but there can be no doubt that the property is still missing.
104. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 (1992); but see id. at 2921-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("New appreciation of the significance of endangered species... shapes our evolving
understandings of property rights.") (citations omitted).
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We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking. 05
Thus, Professor Sax has acknowledged, as he must, that Lucas
stands for the proposition that "[s]tates may not regulate land use
solely by requiring landowners to maintain their property in its natu-
ral state as part of a functioning ecosystem, even though those natural
functions may be important to the ecosystem."'" Professor Sax sug-
gests that "Lucas addresses legislation imposed to maintain ecological
services performed by land in its natural state."' 1 7 The ESA gener-
ally, and section 9's habitat modification rule in particular, can be cat-
egorized in such a manner.
The practical effect of the habitat modification rule is to impose a
servitude across the landscape for the benefit of wildlife. Yet, section
5 of the ESA authorizes acquisition of such important habitat "by
purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein...
in addition to any other land acquisition authority vested in [the ap-
propriate Secretary].' 8 In Lucas, Justice Scalia reviewed many ex-
isting statutes authorizing the use of the eminent domain power to
impose such servitudes on private scenic lands, preventing develop-
mental uses, or to the acquisition of such lands altogether. Justice
Scalia concluded that South Carolina had unconstititionally taken Lu-
cas's property. 1°9
Thus, the Court held in Lucas that "when the owner of real prop-
erty has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property eco-
nomically idle, he has suffered a taking." 10 Further support for ex-
tending the Lucas holding to other "public purpose" cases is found in
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, a dispute over the use of pri-
105. I at 2894-95. Justice Brennan probably would have agreed with this
formulation:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use re-
strictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote
the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical inva-
sion of property. From the property owner's point of view, it may matter
little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by
regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive
him of all beneficial use of it.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
106. Property Rights, supra note 1, at 1438.
107. d at 1439.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (1988).
109. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 (citing, for example, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3921-3923 authoriz-
ing acquisition of wetlands, etc.).
110. Il
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vately-owned wetlands."' In Loveladies, the Clinton Administration
decided not to seek U.S. Supreme Court review of a ruling by the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decision that the govern-
ment must provide just compensation for forcing a landowner to
maintain his property in its natural condition by denying a dredge and
fill permit for a wetlands parcel.112
Loveladies accepted the proposition that the government can law-
fully prevent a property owner from filling or otherwise injuring or
destroying vital wetlands but may not let the cost of obtaining this
public benefit fall solely on the affected property owner." 3 Like Lu-
cas, Loveladies recognized an exception to the compensation rule
when the regulatory imposition results from the State's inherent po-
lice power to abate a public nuisance as defined by the "background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.""' 4
While common law principles "rarely support prohibition of the 'es-
sential use' of land,""' 5 the Lucas nuisance inquiry nevertheless re-
quires an analysis of several factors:
* the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent
private property, posed by the activities;
" the social value and suitability of the activities to the locality in
question;
" the relative ease with which the harm can be avoided through
measures taken by the claimant and the government or adja-
cent private landowners;
* the fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by simi-
larly situated landowners, which ordinarily imports a lack of a
common law prohibition;
" changed circumstances or new knowledge that may make what
was previously permissible no longer so; and
" the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted
to continue the use denied to the claimant."16
The Lucas nuisance factors can be argued both ways and give little
certainty of outcome to landowners, particularly because the law of
property and nuisance will vary from state to state." 7 In essence,
111. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
112. See Environmental Policy Alert, Feb. 1, 1995, at 26.
113. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1175.
114. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 ("A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.").
115. Id at 2901 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
116. Id.
117. Especially problematic for landowners is the changed circumstances factor.
Justice Stevens, for example, dissenting in Lucas, suggested that "[n]ew appreciation
of the significance of endangered species ... shapes our evolving understandings of
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however, a case like A&M" 8 squarely presents the taking question.
A&M's entire parcel"19 has been sequestered for the duration of the
injunction12 0 and perhaps permanently if Sweet Home is not upheld.
The government has permitted neighboring landowners, the Quinault
Tribe, to engage in exactly the same activity disallowed for A&M.
There is no economic value to the land in its natural state and the
value of the old growth timber on the land once harvested likely ex-
ceeds five million dollars. Timber harvest per se has never been a
public nuisance in Washington, and the State Legislature has declared
that a viable forest products industry is of prime importance to the
State's economy.12 '
Balanced against these factors in favor of A&M is the speculative
harm that might befall the owl pair living almost two miles away.' 22
The potential loss of reproductivity or foraging opportunities or the
increased exposure to predation are all dependent on factors outside
the control of A&M (i.e., which way the bird flies to forage and what
predators might be waiting that would not otherwise be present but
for the A&M harvest). Recall that the owls in question have never
been seen on the property. One might query whether the cause of any
harm to the owls would be the result of the A&M harvest or the previ-
ously government-approved harvest by the Quinault Tribe in which
the government authorized the incidental take of the very pair at is-
sue. And, the government itself conceded with the announcement of
the special rule for the conservation of the spotted owl that the A&M
owl pair was not essential to the survival of the species as a whole
because the government chose not to protect the A&M habitat under
the special rule.
Given these facts it would be difficult to conclude, regardless of the
outcome of Sweet Home, that a Lucas taking had not occurred in the
A&M case. TWo takings cases presenting A&M-like facts-one in
Oregon and one in Washington-based on prohibitions on harvest for
protection of spotted owls are pending. In Boise Cascade Corp. v.
property rights" and may lead to regulation to protect such species. Id. at 2921-22
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Thus, some could argue that the Lucas
nuisance exception is not quite so narrow or protective of private property rights.
118. United States v. Anderson & Middleton Logging Co., No. C93-5697 (W.D.
Wash. filed Dec. 9, 1993). See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
119. The fact that the entire parcel is covered avoids the difficult question of the
relevant parcel for takings analysis. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
120. Damages for temporary takings, of course, are recoverable. First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the Just Compen-
sation Clause).
121. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 76.09.010(1) (West 1994).
122. Indeed, the United States has pursued settlement with the Company because
of the apparent lack of demonstrable harm to the owl. The settlement framework
permits the Company to log the property or the government to acquire it at fair mar-
ket value. Telephone conversations with counsel for Anderson & Middleton Co.
(dates not available).
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Board of Forestry,'23 the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
missal of Boise's claim of inverse condemnation due to a total depri-
vation of economic value from the imposition of a 70-acre owl circle
covering its parcel of timber it was contracted to harvest. 124 The court
determined that Boise stated a claim but that further evidentiary de-
velopment was necessary, remanding for a trial. 25
In SDS Lumber Co. v. Washington,26 a stop work order issued
against a lumber company prevented it from harvesting 230 acres of
privately owned commercial forest. The order was issued to preserve
habitat for a spotted owl that had moved into the area after a harvest-
ing permit had been approved. The company alleged inverse condem-
nation by "creating a public wildlife reserve on private land.' '1 27
Although SDS Lumber pleaded inartfully, it should not hinder the
claim. It is well settled that "the State has the absolute right to main-
tain its game and wild animals upon any and all private lands, and in
that act there is no element of trespass or taking.' 28 Indeed, a State
can establish a wildlife refuge or sanctuary on private lands within
which the killing, trapping, or possession of the protected species is
prohibited, even when the protected species damage crops or other
property. 29 The operative pleading should have been that the State
compelled the landowner to refrain from the productive use of his
property for the benefit of wildlife, thereby imposing a conservation
easement or negative servitude across the property without
compensation.
Even though the categorical A&M-type cases should be the easiest
to decide under Lucas, they will not be the most common. More
123. 886 P.2d 1033 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1041.
126. Complaint, SDS Lumber Co. v. Washington, No. 93-200003-6 (Klickitat
County Superior Court, filed Jan. 11, 1993).
127. Id. at 1.
128. Cook v. State, 74 P.2d 199, 201 (Wash. 1937). The case law in the states sug-
gests that when it maintains wildlife on private land, it is not a physical occupation
requiring compensation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982). This is not, however, the same as a rule aimed at keeping the land in
its natural state to house wildlife. Justice Scalia suggested this very distinction in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 n.14 (1992) ("The
equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the practice of religion without
being aimed at religion is a law that destroys the value of land without being aimed at
land. Perhaps such a law ... cannot constitute a compensable taking") (citation omit-
ted). The habitat protection rule protecting wildlife imposes affirmative obligations
on a landowner to use the property in a manner often inconsistent with the purpose
for which it was acquired and has traditionally been used. This is a far cry from saying
to the landowner, who has a refuge imposed over his private lands, "Don't shoot the
King's game."
129. Cook, 74 P.2d at 202 (quoting Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 100 (1917) (hold-
ing that government re-introduction of beaver to area did not make it liable for dam-
age to valuable trees)); see also Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
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likely, takings cases under the ESA will require courts to analyze the
claims under the three-part test set out in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City: "The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has in-
terfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the government
action.' '1 30
Unfortunately, Lucas provides little assistance in formulating an an-
alytical approach to partial takings cases. Thus, Lucas leaves open
whether the government can force a private landowner to keep some
of his or her land in its natural condition for the benefit of the public
without compensation, such as riparian management zones and
streamside buffers, wildlife reserve and recruitment trees, road buffers
and other such aesthetic "landscape architecture."
The distinction between partial and total takings "leads to massive
doctrinal discontinuities"' 13' and dubious outcomes. As Justice Scalia
admitted in Lucas:
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will
get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full.
But that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity
between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway(who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is reduced
to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing).
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing" situations.' 32
Justice Scalia suggested that "[t]he answer to this difficult question
may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the
State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the partic-
ular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges
a diminution in (or elimination of) value.' 33 If he is correct, timber
companies, for example, should be pleased because states historically
have recognized the right of timber owners to extract the profit from
the land.13 4
Ultimately, the marriage of Sweet Home and Lucas, if it comes at
all, may come in the canon of construction that says a statute should
be construed narrowly 135 to avoid entanglement with the Just Com-
pensation Clause. Such an approach to statutory interpretation is ap-
propriate in an "identifiable class of cases in which application of a
130. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted).
131. Epstein, supra note 21, at 1375.
132. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8 (emphasis added).
133. Id at 2894 n.7.
134. See supra note 17.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
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statute will necessarily constitute a taking."' 36 Applied to Sweet
Home, the Court could speak volumes about the reach of Lucas and
the future prospects of the Economy of Nature while eliminating the
habitat modification rule on the grounds that it exceeds the scope of
Congress's statutory authorization.
CONCLUSION
The Economy of Nature prefers economic harm to humans over
environmental harm to wildlife, however indirect, caused by human
activities. This may be a valid policy preference, but it is not the law.
If it becomes the law, the fundamental building blocks of our repre-
sentative democracy will be imperiled. Property rights protect liberty.
To the extent property rights are viewed as interfering with sound en-
vironmental practice, the public should either acquire the necessary
interests to avoid the harm (assuming that the harm does not rise to
the level of a public nuisance subject to abatement without compensa-
tion) or provide incentives to landowners to forego voluntarily the
rents from full use of the land.
In sum, Professor Sax's argument reduces to an assertion that the
state can forbid all uses of land without compensation for whatever
legitimate state purpose(s) the Romantics decide. One could easily
envision the opposite regime in which the state could prohibit no use
without payment to the affected individuals. 37 This, after all, was Lu-
cas's position in the trial court and on appeal, at least as to total depri-
vation.138 The answer more likely falls in between, well grounded in
and limited by traditional concepts of nuisance and property law.
136. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985) (re-
jecting application of the doctrine in wetlands permit case when no permit had been
sought).
137. A host of property rights legislation at the state and federal level adopts this
very approach, requiring compensation for some or any diminution in value. See
Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Taking Legislation: Misguided and Dangerous,
LAND UsE LAW 3-6 (Oct. 1994).
138. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890 (1992) ("Lucas
did not take issue with the validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South Carolina's
police power, but contended that the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's
value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in
furtherance of legitimate police power objectives").
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